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ABSTRACT
In comparison with the other transportation modes, rail rapid
transit already enjoys a higher degree of safety as it is designed with
the exclusive right of way and the automatic train control and monitoring systems. Nevertheless, rail rapid transit systems are not free
from serious accidents, which often led to human injuries and facility
damages. The planning of accident prevention and emergency
measures, therefore, are still important issues of the rail rapid transit
operations. The model presented in this study analyses the process of
hazard identification in two stages, which clearly indicate the factors
of the inherent and direct hazard and the weaknesses in the response
system. The study uses the fire accident took place in the Mucha Line
of Taipei Rapid Transit System in 1993 as an example to illustrate the
hazard identification model by pointing out the cause of the incident
and the weakness in the emergency systems.

INTRODUCTION
Rail rapid transits have already become an indispensable means of public transportation for modern
cities. To date, there are hundreds of rail rapid transit
systems located in different parts of the world. While
these systems have provided solutions for a fast,
comfortable, reliable, and convenient means of transportation for travels in the urban areas, the rail rapid
transit is also expected to provide comprehensive measures to ensure the operation safety. In comparison with
the other transportation modes, rail rapid transit already
enjoys a higher degree of safety as it is designed with the
exclusive right of way and the automatic train control
and monitoring systems. Still, rail rapid transit systems
are not free from serious accidents, which often lead to
human injuries and facility damages and may result in
secondary disasters (e.g., heavy injuries may be in-
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curred by electrical shocks in the confusion of
evacuation). According to the statistics from FTA [4]
(1993, 1994, 1995), the heavy rail transit suffered a
fatality rate of 0.78 per hundred million passengermiles for patrons and non-patrons fatalities.occurring
often involve some difficult issues, e.g., the control of
operators and passengers and the constraints of the
facility and the local environment. Perhaps, it is inevitable that “mishandling are prone to occur whenever
manual operation is involved; failures are inevitable
whenever machines are employed.” Many factors may
leads to accidents. If the factors that might resulting in
accidents can be identified in advance, some safety
process will react to and the loose and damages maybe
reduced or eliminated. Therefore, the chief objective of
this study is designing methods to identify the hazards
of the rail rapid transit accidents. The rail rapid transit
mentioned in this study includes the heavy and light rail
rapid transits, which have the exclusive right of way,
grade separation and the automatic train control and
monitoring systems. The definition of “accident” could
be termed as unpredictable and unexpected, but in this
study, the so-called “accidents” have the causes readily
identifiable; only the precise moment when their effects
will be noticed is unknown. The definition of hazard is
“the source of energy and the physiological and behavioral factors which, when uncontrolled, lead to harmful
occurrences.” [5]
Hazard identification has been an important issue
in occupational safety and the chemical process
industries; there are several hazard identification
techniques, such as What-if, Checklist, What-if/
Checklist, Hazard and operability study (HAZOP), Failure mode and effects analysis, and Fault tree analysis
[13]. On the other hand, hazard identification is closely
related with the risk assessment. A risk assessment
model described by the National Research Council
(NRC) of the National Academy of Sciences [10] has
been widely used by several government agencies of the
United States, including the EPA, for assessing the risk
of cancer and other health risks that result from exposure to chemicals. According to this model, risk assess-
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ment consists of “hazard identification, dose-response
assessment, exposure assessment, and risk
characterization.” The NRC report describes hazard
identification as a major undertaking that produces a
qualitative determination of whether exposure to a hazardous agent can cause adverse effects. This includes
determining cause and effect, weighing the available
evidence, and characterizing the nature and strength of
the evidence of causation. Differently, Covello and
Merkhofer (1993) proposed another model of risk
assessment, which regards hazard identification as an
altogether separate process that is necessarily conducted
prior to risk assessment. They think that treating hazard
identification as merely one component of risk assessment underplays its importance. Thus in their model,
they define the qualitative process of hazard identification as a distinct process that is on a par with and of
equal importance to the quantitative process of risk
assessment.
Clearly, this study focuses on such a qualitative
approach to identify these hazardous factors of rapid
transit. The results might be a starting point for further
quantitative risk assessment, or used to develop corrective and precautionary measures for some proved damages of accidents. Accordingly, a case study of the fire
accidents happened in the Taipei rapid transit system
follows this hazards identification model to illustrate
the causes of the accidents and to verify the application
of this model.
In the following chapters, the study aims to develop a hazard identification model by reviewing the
theory on accident analysis and the rail rapid transit
safety features. The hazard identification model con-
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sists of two parts: the cause-effect chart of hazards
induced by three elements (human, system and
environment) and the two-stage analysis. Finally, the
fire accident happened at the Mucha Line of Taipei
Rapid Transit is used as the example to validate the
model.
RAIL RAPID TRANSIT HAZARD
IDENTIFICATION MODEL
Given the information of many transit accidents in
the past, the accident types and causes may be induced
like in the Table 1. However, the real hazards that cause
the accident and the relation between them are not easy
to figure out intuitively. Therefore, this study proposes
a rail rapid transit hazard identification model to facilitate the analysis. This model first establishes the causeeffect charts of hazardous factors that lead to unsafe
conditions and then a two-stage analysis is adapted to
identify the hazards of the respective incidents or
accidents.
1. Elements of hazards identification
Generally, rail rapid transit hazards occur because
of three elements: (1) Human: operators and passengers;
(2) System: material, equipment, tools, and safety
facility; (3) Environment: temperature, humidity,
ventilation, lights, and noises (natural environment and
artificial environment) in the working place. These
three elements as contain danger, and may change as the
time passes by if there is no proper control and
management; therefore, practicing to control and elimi-

Table 1. List of major transit accident types and possible causes

Types

Possible Causes

Fire

Arson, failure of electrical equipment, brakes operation, storage of inflammable
material, derailing, the strike of lightening
Flood
Poor design or failure of the drainage system
Collisions
(1) Violation of stop signs by the driver (intrusion). (2) Failure of the ATC system.
(3) Signal errors. (4) Breakdown or mishandling of the split switch.
Derailment
(1) Incomplete release of hand brake. (2) Inadequate geometric design. (3) Excessive rocking
of the trains (4) Speeding at the turn. (5) Damage of the bearing and wheel. (6) Rail deformation.
Door Accident
Jammed by the door or the uncontrolled opening of the door.
Breakdowns of power Failure of the power supply or emergency power supply facilities, overload,
supply system
mishandling, or struck by lightening.
Intrusion
Animals or people could be found intruding the track on the level ground or the station.
Gap fall
Inadequate design of the platform or station
Scraped by the train
Mindless passenger or lack of proper signs on the platform
Natural Disaster
Earthquakes, lightening, storms, or heat waves
Others
Criminal Acts, suicide, crowding, etc.
* Induced from NTSB (1972-1981); San Francisco BART (1985-1988); and Wang (1993).
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nate the factors of hazards on these elements is the basis
of preventing adverse consequences.
If we analyze specifically about the causes that
lead to system and environmental unsafe conditions, we
find that almost all defects come from human errors in
design, installation, operation, treatment, and uses.
Hollnagel (1993) reveal that the estimated involvement
of human error in the breakdown of hazardous technologies increased fourfold between the 1960s and the 1990s,
from minima of around 20% to maxima of more than
80%. Even the defects in natural environment can be
reduced or prevented by pre-alarm system and preventive measures. Therefor, almost all unsafe conditions
could be regarded as human errors or faults. If we can
eliminate the above-mentioned unsafe elements to control human behavior, both unsafe behavior and unsafe
conditions will not happen again. After a series of
researches on accident causation model, Reason (1995)
proposed a system approach to analysis organizational
error, and the main focus is upon the human contribution within these broader systems domains. However,
human behaviors are extremely complicated and are
affected by personal characteristics and environmental
conditions. As the hazards in rail rapid transit accident
are concerned, the major factors that affect human
behaviors are suggested as in Fig. 1.
Though the human error could be regarded as the
major cause of rail rapid transit accident, the human
behaviors also result from the transit equipment,
facilities, and the other environmental factors. Even the
personal desire, emotion and personality are nurtured in
society. These internal and external conditions interact
on each other to form human conscious and subcon-

Fig. 1. Main factors affecting human behavior in rail rapid transit
hazards.

scious actions, which will be complicated and difficult
to understand in a lopsided view. That is why all the
factors must be considered altogether; otherwise, it
would be difficult to find out real hazards and prevent
unsafe behavior from happening recurrently.
2. Establishing the cause-effect relationship
In this section, contributing factors for the cause of
rail rapid transit accidents are proposed and classified
as human induced, system induced, or environmentally
induced. Most of the accidents, however, are not caused
by a single factor, there are usually a cluster of factors
interacted with each other. As the three groups of main
factors bear influences on one another, it is important to
devise a scheme that can manage the consequence of the
three elements and recognize hazardous conditions to
ensure the operation safety. The following Fig. 2 to Fig.
4 are the fishbone charts that this study uses to provide
cause-effect relationship of how these factors lead to
hazards. In these figures, the large-boned branches are
the latent causes and the sub-branches are the active
causes, which both contribute to one of the three main
factors (in the backbone of the fish) and will finally lead
to unsafe behaviors or unsafe conditions (in the fish
head). Note that the active causes in the sub-branches
are obviously not comprehensive or restricted within
those factors for all situations. Different cases or even
different transit organizations should fine-tune these
active and latent factors and bring up their own hazardous factors when applying these figures.

Fig. 2. Human induced hazards in rail rapid transit systems.
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3. Human induced factors

5. Environmentally induced factors

Human induced accidents could be attributed to
either the operators or the passengers, but the operators
are more likely to be the media of accidents. Factors
leading to operator induced accidents include (a) Physical and mental conditions. Fatigue or other illness may
cause the operators to perform erroneous procedure.
Unstable mental state could also influence normal
operation; (b) Immature operating skills; (c) Failure to
follow the operation procedure; (d) Lack of safety knowledge and awareness. Factors leading to the passengerinduced accidents are (e) Illegal actions; (f) Mindless of
the dangers; (g) Deliberate act; (h) Deficient in common
sense. The above factors are the main latent causes and
indicated at the large-boned branches of Fig. 2. One or
two possible active causes are proposed and followed in
each sub-branch.

This aspect can be further divided into the natural
environment and the working environment. 1. Natural
environment. Such as earthquakes, lightening, flood,
typhoons, or heat waves may affect the transit operation.
2. Working environment. Working environment can be
further divided into two parts, the software and the
hardware. Software includes organizational structure,
management efficiency, remuneration, and labor
relations. Hardware refers to the lighting, the ventilation,
temperature, and humidity of the place at work. An
efficient and integral operating organization is not only
to the organization itself, but it also has direct influence
on the control and prevention of the human-induced and
system-induced hazards.

4. System induced factors

The process of rail rapid transit hazard identification can be described in two stages. This is depicted as
in Fig. 5.

The rail rapid transit system is composed of equipment (rolling stock, signaling, and power supply) and
station facilities (platform, track, and others). The
factors leading to the system induced accidents include
(a) Inadequate selection of equipment. Examples
include: capacity of the equipment could not satisfy the
functional demand, the equipment is below the safety
standard; and equipment cannot adapt to the unique
environmental set up. (b) Inadequate installation of
equipment; (c) Inadequate maintenance of equipment;
(d) Equipment exceeding the design life cycle. (e) Inadequate application of equipment; (f) Inadequate design
of equipment. These factors are indicated as in the Fig.
3.

Fig. 3. System induced hazards in rail rapid transit systems.

6. Two-stage analysis

A. The first stage
Three groups of potential hazardous (humaninduced, system induced, and environmentally induced)
factors would cause the system unsafe conditions, while
they might not affect the normal operation immediately.
Under such a situation, the specific unsafe conditions or
behaviors can trace back and identify the inherent hazards by applying the fishbone charts of human, system

Fig. 4. Environmentally induced hazards in rail rapid transit systems.
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or environment induced factors. In this case, most of the
hazards can be eliminated under a perfect management
system, for example: an accurate routine check system,
the alertness of the operators, a good auditing system,
and a strict quality and safety control system.
B. The Second Stage
Necessary defenses or barriers are the last shift use
to keep the unsafe situations from adverse consequences.
If the unsafe situations keep on remaining in the system,
the barriers themselves are identified as the source of
direct hazards in the second stage. As far as the rail
rapid transit is concerned, all the safety design is targeted in removing the hazardous factors. Whereas the
potential hazards are not eliminated in the first stage,
the automatic train operation control and monitoring
system will come into play. The Automatic Train
Supervision (ATS) and Automatic Train Protection
(ATP) should detect any abnormalities in the system
and send the messages to the control center for correction,
or to the driver to pull on the emergency brake. If the
system involves no manual operation, i.e., a “driverless” system, the rate of removing errors through the
automatic train control and monitoring system should
be 100%. Once the unsafe conditions keep on exposing,
the hazards in the second stage will be identified by the
factors that the automatic train control and monitoring
system fail to respond with safety measures and stop the
exposure of hazardous elements.
All the elements of hazards, i.e., the human, system and environment, are the foundation for the analysis.
At first stage, the inherent hazards are identified by the
related factors of these three elements for different
incidents. Though the direct hazards are identified
specifically in relation to the automatic train control and
monitoring system at the second stage, the defects of
such defending systems still result from factors belong
to human, system or environment induced.
The two-stage analysis provides the first step to
detect the causes of rail rapid transit accidents and
composes the major part of the hazard identification
model. To explain how to use it, we will demonstrate the
process by the real case in next section.

mercial operation starts at March 1996. Five serious
accidents, which suspending trains operation over one
hour, were recorded for the first year of commissioning,
which is way over the acceptable standard (0 accident
per million km)
Mucha line uses the MATRA VAL 256 system,
which is originally designed as a “driverless”, twocoach (one married-pair) system, with one coach
equipped with ATC system. The Department of Rapid
Transit Systems (DRTS) of Taipei city government,
however, demand the system to change to a two married-pair system to provide better service capacity and
operation flexibility with the condition that the new
design should include operation safety guarantee, facility integration, and protection of passenger emergency
evacuation. The VAL automatic control system in each
married-pair is designed with the fail-safe principle and
consisted of On-Board Control Unit (OBCU, including
on-board ATP, ATO, and ATS), Fixed Automatic Train
Control (Fixed ATC), Dwell Operation Control Unit
(DOCU), Operation Control Center (OCC), and Safety
Frequency and High Voltage Logic [8]. After four
month of the first fire incident, the second fire incident
happened at about five o’clock in the morning of September 24, 1993, while the two married-pair is driving
back to maintenance depot under automatic train
operation. The passer-by heard the explosion and saw
the smoky train. The OCC did not aware of the situation
until the witness informed the fire department. Though
the OCC broke the circuit immediately, the train was
burned in great fire that is higher than the roof of the
train and clearly watched by the citizenry through the
morning TV news. This event became the headlines and
shocked the audience.
According to the press release of the accident
report submitted by MATRA for this event (quoted from

CASE STUDY
Mucha line is the first completed and the only
automatic guided light rail rapid transit line in Taipei.
Along the 10.9-kilometer route, there are 12 stations
and a Mucha maintenance depot. The construction date
started in 1988. Forecasted substantial completion date
was originally August 2, 1993, which deferred to June
1994 for two serious fire accidents. Finally, the com-

Fig. 5. Two-stage analysis for the identification of hazards in the rail
rapid transit.
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the news reported by China Times, October 14, 1993):
“The accident was induced by the failure of Traction
Safety Rank (TSR) in the third coach of the two married-couple. Because the brake system was malfunctioned, it could not transmit the correct messages to the
brake control system, which meant the automatic control system could not inform the other coaches to brake.
A coach with the jammed brake being dragged forward
by the other three coaches in motion was the cause of the
accident.” The failures of the Traction Safety Rank and
the brake system are unsafe conditions that are result
from several factors of hazard. Through the application
of hazard identification model presented in last section,
the consequence and factors of hazard within this accident are analyzed as follows and depicted as in Fig. 6.

caught in fire. The fire accident was created after this
stage, and the factors of hazard that broke the barrier are
described in the following sections and indicated in Fig.
8.

1. The First Stage

B. ATP had detected brake failure

The unsafe conditions, such as the breakdown of
the Traction Safety Rank and the brake system, are
classified as system failure - an inherent cause of
accident. These hazards induced by system factors
could be identified as “Inadequate design and maintenance of equipment” and “Inadequate selection of
equipment”, which are indicated as the rightest branch
in Fig. 7. Another unsafe condition that the OCC fail to
be aware of the incident immediately is the total effect
of the three elements. The operation staff explained
they received too many false messages at that time, so
they turn off the alarm bell. This could be regarded as
the “lack of safety knowledge and awareness”. There
might be insufficient safety training for the staff and the
emergency procedure is defective. Furthermore, the
corporate culture in the operation authority is not aware
enough of the importance of safety. 2. The Second
Stage After the brake was jammed, the train still ran for
an hour and a half (about 2 km) before the wheel was

Message was transmitted to the control center, but
the response of the operator at the control center still fail
to stop the exposure of hazards.
1. The operator at the control center made a wrong
judgment and did not respond by pulling the brake
after receiving the message from ATP. Two contradicting forces could be at work at this time. The
operator is giving the command through ATO to
allow the train to go forward, while the fail-safe
features in ATP is pulling the train to come to a
complete stop, hence the safe barrier was broken by
the error responding of the operator.
2. The operator responded by pulling the mergency
brake, but the system was unable to respond due to the

Fig. 6. Two-stage analysis for hazard identification in Mucha lin.

A. ATP did not detect any brake failure
No message was sent to the control center and no
emergency measure was taken to correct the situation,
hence, the unsafe situation keep on remaining. There
are three possible factors accounting for the ATP’s
failure to detect abnormalities: (a) There was a design
defect in ATP; (b) There was a material or manufacturing defect, or (c) ATP was unable to function due to high
temperature, magnetic or electric wave interference.

Fig. 7. Hazards identified in the first stage analysis PERSONAL
(Internal conditions).
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defect integrating the systems between the two married-pair, i.e., one married pair was braking and the
other was running forward, hence the deficient of the
communication between the two married pair would
be the direct hazards in this stage.
The above analysis was verified in the report [2]
that the cause of the September 24, 1993 fire accident
was the defect in the design of connecting the married
pair. After ATP detected TSR failure in one married
pair, it immediately pulled the emergency brake for that
system. However, the ATP located in the other married
pair did not pick up the messages and carried on driving
which led to the wearing of tires. After the train was
dragged on for 2 km, it eventually broke out in fire. This
is the same as analyzed in the above: the defect integrating the systems between the two married-pair.
In this evaluation report, MATRA proposed seven
corrections as the following to improve the safety of the
trains and to keep the fire accident from happening
again.
1. Install a General Brake Pressure Control Unit that
operated by the OBCU.
2. Limit the brake power output during the movement.
3. Enhance the OBCU to automatically verify the output
information of the TSR, and the consistence between
this information of TSR and the requests from OBCU.
4. Cutoff Traction order in case of Permanent Break
Failure (PBF).
5. Add the signal of PBF on the panel of OCC to help the
operator making proper decision.
6. Between the brake disk and the rubber tire, add a heat
insulation pad that has installed a heat detector on it.
ATP didn’t
detect any
brake failure
1. Design defects
in ATP,
2. Material or
manufacturing
defects,
3. Unable to
function due to
external

ATP
had
detecte
d brake
failure

Failure
messages
were
sent to
OCC

Broke this
coach and
transmitted
message to
the ATP of
another
coaches

Control
center
make no
response

Control center
responded
incorrectly
The operator
pulled the
emergency brake

The
train
kept on
moving

Accident

Another coaches broke
immediately
Defects in
integration of
ATC system,
another coaches
did not brake.

Fig. 8. Consequence diagram for hazards dentification in the second
stage analysis.

7. Add a “Coasting Mode” at the time that the coach is
starting off to verify the function of PBF detector.
After such improvements, the failure of brakes in
any wheel will be passed immediately to the OBCU and
the highest control center to switch off the motor. In
case of this circuit fails to cut off the traction
immediately, the braked wheel will keep on rotating
because the torque between the wheel and the dry road
surface is larger than that of the brake disk. MATRA
says that the new installed heat insulation pad and heat
detector on it will send out a warning and switch off the
motor emergently when the detected temperature is
higher than 110°C. If the wheels are locked and dragged
instead of rotating in the wet road surface, the representative of the Michelin tire company says that the tires
will not catch fire but will be worn into puncture. The
inspection committee of the city government had recorded and verified these seven corrections in the final
reports. So far the Mucha line has been operating
commercially for five years (1996-2001). The other
three mass transit lines (steel wheel, high capacity) also
start to serve during these years. The fire accidents
never happen again and the amount of serious accidents
is decreasing from 10 times a year in 1997 to 4 times a
year in 1999. (According to the statistics data in the web
site of Taipei Rapid Transit Company, TRTC: http://
www.trtc.com.tw)
In addition to the above improvements of the brake
system, the inspection committee is also devoted on
four parts: construction, mechanics and electronic
equipment, system integration, and operation
management. The committee made comments on the
improper corporate culture of transit authority (DRTS
and TRTC) and the inadequate emergency procedure.
However, these two comments are only parts of those
observations that this study has interpreted in the Fig. 7,
and there are another two groups of hazards identified
from environment and human perspectives. For example,
the publicly owned TRTC has been criticized for inefficient management by the citizen and is demanded to
become a private company.
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
The hazards identified in rail rapid transit are
different with other transportation modes for two reasons.
First, the rail rapid transit is operating under a highly
isolated and controlled environment, so the effect of
external factors has been reduced considerably. Under
the circumstance, the designing and management of the
system are the major source of hazards and play critical
roles for safety. Second, the rail rapid transit safety
features enable the automatic monitoring systems to
eliminate the exposure of hazards immediately once the
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hazards are identified. While the hazards keep on
exposing, the automatic monitoring system itself must
be defective and could be regarded as another factors of
hazards.
Owing to such differences, the model presented in
this study analyses the process of hazard identification
in stages, which clearly indicates the factors of the
hazard and the weaknesses in the response system. In
the investigation of rail rapid transit accidents, the most
easily identified causes are usually related to the equipment or facility failure, such as short circuit, brake jam
or erroneous signal. The model proposed by this study
however, helps to identify all the hidden and the direct
causes of the disaster. The two-stage analysis considering the inherent hazards in the first stage and the direct
hazards in the second stage proposes a clear structure to
go through the analyzing process and provides more
information to the safety planner. When applying to
accident causal analysis, the identification of hazards is
not concluded with equipment causes, but include human and environment factors at the same time.
When the rail rapid transit accident has happened,
the passive strategy derived from this hazard identification model is to recognize the defects in the analyzed
system to formulate safety recommendations to improve transportation safety and stop the recurrence. The
active or constructive plan of safety management is to
control and eliminate the identified inherent hazards by
farther improved managerial measures to prevent the
accident from occurrence. Finally, what can be done
after the identification of hazards? “It seems clear that
the pursuit of safety must be pointed toward the identification of hazards, determination of their significance,
evaluation of the available correctives, and selection of
the optimal remedies. When this path is followed, it
ends with the control of unwanted events at an irreducible minimum” [5]. This is the practical view of accident prevention and the application of the model presented in this study can be the basis for further implementation for the transit authority. The analysts of risk
assessment can acquire this model to develop quantitative method for analyzing the rail rapid transit accidents.
Since the rail rapid transit is one of the public transportation modes, researchers might consider collecting the
factors of hazards for other public modes, like aviation
and bus transit or other rail modes and should benefit
from the ideas presented in this paper.

85

REFERENCES
1. Covello, V.T. and Merkhofer, M.W., Risk Assessment
Methods: Approaches for Assessing Health and Environmental Risks, Plenum Press, New York (1993).
2. Department of Rapid Transit Systems, Taipei Rapid
Transit Red Book -Mucha Line Evaluation Report, Taipei
City Government, Taiwan, R.O.C. (1995).
3. Florio, A.E., Alles, W.F., and Stafford, G.T., Safety
Education, 4th edition, McGraw-Hill, New York (1979).
4. FTA (Federal Transit Administration), National Transit
Database, U.S. Department of Transportation,
Washington, D.C. (1993-1995).
5. Grimaldi, J.V. and Simonds, R.H., Safety Management.,
5th edition, Richard D. Irwin, Inc., Boston, MA (1989).
6. Heinrich, H.W. and Granniss, E.R., Industrial Accident
Prevention: A Scientific Approach, 4th edition, McGrawHill, New York (1959).
7. Hollnagel, E., Human Reliability Analysis: Context and
Control. Academic, London (1993).
8. Hwang, C.Y., “VAL System Controlling Architecture,”
Rapid-Transit Technol., (in Chinese) Vol. 4, pp. 4-13
(1991).
9. Keefer, W.D., “Circumstances Surrounding Accidents,”
Industrial Safety, Blake, R.P. (Ed.), 2nd edition, PrenticeHall, Inc., New Jersey, pp. 45-59 (1955).
10. NRC (National Research Council), Risk Assessment in
the Federal Government: Managing the Process. NASNRC Committee on the Institutional Means for Assessment of Risks to Public Health, National Academy Press,
Washington, D.C. (1983).
11. NTSB (National Transportation Safety Board), Rail
Rapid Transit Report, Washington, D.C. (1972-1981).
12. OSHA (Occupational Safety and Health Administration),
Process Safety Management of Highly Hazardous
Chemicals, Explosives and Blasting Agents, Federal
Register 57, 36, 6356-6402 (1992).
13. Reason, J., “A System Approach to Organizational
Error,” Ergonomics, Vol. 38, No. 8, pp. 1708-1721
(1995).
14. San Francisco BART (Bay Area Rapid Transit District),
Passenger Injuries Quarterly Report, Oakland Center,
CA(1985-1988).
15. Wang, L.C., “A Study of Rail Rapid Transit Hazards,”
Proceedings of the 8th Annual Conference for the Chinese Institute of Transportation, Taipei, Taiwan, R.O.C.
pp. 81-88 (1993).

